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Striking a Balance: Basic Questions About 
Consumer Protection Law 
Kurt Eggert∗ 
Chapman Law Reviewís annual symposium, this year 
entitled ìResponsibility and Reform: Striking a Balance in the 
Marketplace,î is focused on an important issue in todayís legal 
landscape: how much and what kinds of protections should be 
provided to consumers?  Central to this issue is how to balance 
the protection of consumersí persons and pocketbooks with the 
defense of their autonomy, how to keep consumers from entering 
into dangerous or disadvantageous transactions without 
stripping them of the freedom to choose for themselves which 
products, services, and deals will most benefit them.  The panels 
of speakers for the symposium were focused on four separate but 
interrelated topics: Predatory Lending, Punitive Damages, Gun 
and Tobacco Liability, and Californiaís Unfair Trade Practices 
Act (Business and Professions Code Section 17200). 
This Introduction sets forth some of the most important 
questions raised in the course of the Symposium and describes 
some answers suggested in the articles that follow.  Naturally, 
the authors often disagree with each other, but my goal is not to 
prove that one side or the other in any debate is correct but 
merely to lay out the questions in a methodical manner and 
direct the reader to the different authorsí attempts to respond to 
these questions. 
1. Which Transactions Benefit Consumers? 
Normally, consumers are better judges of which transactions 
benefit them than any state regulator or legislator could be, as 
consumers have more direct and in depth knowledge of their own 
preferences.  Professor Narveson, in ìConsumerís Rights in the 
Laissez-Faire Economy: How Much Caveat for the Emptor?,î 
states, ìDid Consumer make a ëgood buy?í  Thatís for Consumer 
to decide.î1  However, this basic principle has important 
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limitations, since to be effective judges of whether a transaction 
will provide a net benefit to them, consumers must be informed 
and competent to make the decision at hand, and the transaction 
must be voluntary. 
Most of the disagreement over whether and how much 
protection to provide consumers stems from conflicting opinions 
about when consumersí decisions are sufficiently informed, 
competent, and voluntary.  Too little protection leaves consumers 
vulnerable to abuse.  Too much protection leads to a paternalistic 
restriction of consumersí autonomy.  Where exactly to draw the 
line between protection and paternalism is subject to great 
dispute.  Proponents and opponents of consumer protection 
disagree on how much information consumers need to make 
decisions effectively, who is responsible for ensuring they have 
that information, what decisions consumers are competent to 
make without help, how often they lack the ability to make good 
decisions, and how voluntary their agreements are to the terms 
of various transactions.  How these disputes are resolved is 
central to the design, role, and function of consumer protection 
law. 
2. Should there be a Separate Law of Consumer Protection? 
A basic question addressed in this symposium is whether 
there should be a separate law of consumer protection to begin 
with, or whether the common law systems of contracts and torts 
provide consumers with all the protection they need or deserve, 
or that it is efficient to provide them.  In his article ìConsumer 
Law, Class Actions, and the Common Law,î Greve lays out (only 
to attempt to knock down) the normally stated rationales for 
consumer protection: that buyers have limited information 
gathering and processing abilities or even limited rationality in 
their decision-making process which leads them to make errors 
in their transactions.  This information asymmetry and unequal 
bargaining power between seller and consumer allows merchants 
to take advantage of the ignorance and lack of bargaining 
prowess of the less sophisticated buyers.2 
Greve argues, however, that each of these arguments proves 
either too much or too little, since information asymmetries and 
unequal bargaining powers exist in commercial as well as 
consumer transactions.  Greve is even more concerned about the 
overlay of a consumer protection system on top of the common 
law; worried that a duplicative set of systems will decrease, 
 
 2 Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the Common Law, 7 CHAP. L. 
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rather than increase, the benefits of those laws to consumers.  
Professor Harrell, in his article ìBasic Choices in the Law of Auto 
Finance: Contract Versus Regulation,î also argues for the 
primacy of the common law over separate consumer protection 
law.  He states that because contract and tort law depend on 
case-by-case decision-making by judges, rather than on across-
the-board rule-making by a regulatory body, the common law 
system infringes less on the freedom to contract as it wields a 
more precise scalpel to cut out inappropriate transactions.3  
Harrell also asserts that this system of individual trials is better 
able to address the infinite variety of fraud, duress, and abuse 
than a ìone size fits allî regulatory scheme.  Unlike the common 
law, which Harrell sees as being based on the usage of market 
participants, consumer protection law is largely designed by 
legislators and regulators.  Thus, Harrell views consumer 
protection law as the ìtop-downî imposition of their own interests 
and views by an elite few and fundamentally different from the 
common law, which bubbles up from everyone who participates 
in commerce. 
In contrast, Michael L. Rustad, in his article ìPunitive 
Damages in Cyberspace: Where in the World is the Consumer?,î 
portrays a bleak fate for consumers who cannot depend on 
effective consumer protection law in the unregulated, 
unprotected environment of Internet commerce.  In the wild west 
of cyberspace, consumers face scammers posing as legitimate 
businesses, ìphishingî for credit card numbers and other credit 
information.4  Rustad argues that ordinary damages in tort or 
contract actions would not provide consumers adequate 
protection, as the on-line evildoers are too unlikely to be caught.  
Even when they are caught, rarely can a judgment be collected 
from ìphishersî and Internet scammers. 
3. Should Consumer Protection Generally be Enforced by 
Governmental Agencies, Private Litigation, or Both? 
If consumer protection law is to exist, we must still decide 
whether the dominant means to enforce that law should be 
governmental regulatory enforcement, either through agency 
litigation or otherwise, or private litigation.  In his article 
focusing on the firearms industry, ìSuing the Firearms Industry: 
A Case for Federal Reform?,î Stephen P. Halbrook argues that 
 
 3 Alvin C. Harrell, Basic Choices in the Law of Auto Finance: Contract Versus 
Regulation, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 107, 110-11 (2004). 
 4 Michael L. Rustad, Punitive Damages in Cyperspace: Where in the World is the 
Consumer?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 39, 40 (2004).  ìPhishingî is the act of posing as a legitimate 
business in order to obtain confidential information from another.  Id. at 40-41. 
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where legislation has already struck a definite balance and a 
pervasive set of regulations govern a specific sector of consumer 
affairs, private litigation that is not authorized by that 
legislation and regulatory structure is inappropriate, even if it is 
based on traditional common law causes of action such as public 
nuisance or other torts.5  Greve appears to agree, stating that an 
obvious means of preventing the underdeterrence of wrongdoing 
is to ìentrust public agencies with the definition and enforcement 
of prohibitions and injunctions against unfair or fraudulent 
business practices,î without forcing those agencies to prove the 
common law elements of any cause of action.6  Greve laments 
that only rarely do federal and state regulations, as enforced by 
the appropriate agencies, have preclusive effect and preempt 
private litigation.  He says that ì[c]ompliance defenses rarely 
succeed in liability lawsuits over ëunsafeí pharmaceutical drugs 
or automobiles.  The risk is not simply confusion or incoherence: 
it is massive over-deterrence.î7 
By comparison, and as previously noted, Harrell prefers the 
individualized decision process of common law trials to the 
system-wide rulemaking of regulation.  Harrell also notes that 
ìpublic enforcement has exceeded the volume of private 
litigationî in many areas of federal law.8  Moreover, Harrell notes 
that a significant portion of consumer regulation is federal in 
nature, and that federal regulation, as opposed to state litigation, 
benefits large, national enterprises over smaller, local businesses 
that are less able to bear the burden of complex federal 
regulation.9  Rustad observes that regulatory agencies attempt to 
track down and punish bad actors in cyberspace, but that these 
agencies are overwhelmed.  ìIt is as if the FTC is trying to hold 
back a tidal wave of cyberfraud with a broom.î10 
4. Should Consumer Protection Law Primarily Be Enacted at 
the State or Federal Level? 
A question closely related to the choice between regulatory 
action and private litigation is whether most consumer protection 
law should be enacted at the state or federal level.  Harrell notes 
that regulatory action is more often federal, while most private 
litigation occurs in state courts.  He argues this rough division is 
 
 5 Stephen P. Halbrook, Suing the Firearms Industry: A Case for Federal Reform?, 7 
CHAP. L. REV. 11, 21-22 (2004). 
 6 Greve, supra note 2, at 159-60. 
 7 Id. at 171 (internal citation omitted). 
 8 Harrell, supra note 3 at, 121. 
 9 Id. at 121-22. 
 10 Rustad, supra note 4, at 80. 
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caused by the fact that most common law is state law and even 
statutory contract law is primarily state law, whereas most 
regulatory law, with significant exceptions, is federal law.11  
Harrell asserts that state-based common law is more flexible and 
better able to nourish the development of new and innovative 
industries, while broad-based federal regulation leads more often 
to the dominance of large, stable firms.12 
In his article ìWrong from the Start?  North Carolinaís 
ëPredatory Lendingí Law and the Practice v. Product Debate,î 
Donald C. Lampe worries that, rather than nurturing new and 
innovative financial service companies, the state-based laws 
attempting to prevent predatory lending have created a 
ìregulatory Tower of Babel for multi-state residential mortgage 
lenders.î13  Inconsistent state laws, in Lampeís view, fall too 
heavily on large, multi-state businesses.  Halbrook is also 
concerned that state regulation will lead to an unreasonable 
burden on interstate commerce, in this case, the interstate sale of 
firearms.14 
Playing an important role in deciding whether federal or 
state law will govern consumer issues is the doctrine of 
preemption, which allows federal laws and regulations to 
supercede their state counterparts.  However, states have their 
own arsenal of weapons to combat the wholesale preemption of 
their systems of consumer protection.  Lampe notes that states 
attempt to subvert, stealthily if need be, federal preemption.  For 
example, North Carolinaís predatory lending law focused on 
consumer protection rather than on interest rate limitations as a 
way to avoid the preemptive effect of the Alternative Mortgage 
Transaction Parity Act (ìAMTPAî), which frees protected lenders 
from statesí usury ceilings.15  Lampe argues that, to the extent 
that state law discourages lenders protected by AMTPA from 
making high cost home loans, the state law can be seen as a 
ìstealth overrideî of the federal preemption.16 
By comparison, Harrell celebrates the surprising dominance 
of private state law litigation in the consumer protection arena 
and the fact that federal regulation has not occupied the field.  
This, Harrell states, ìis surely a testament to the viability of the 
common law system and should provide a continuing lesson for 
 
 11 Harrell, supra note 3, at 121-22. 
 12 Id. at 122. 
 13 Donald C. Lampe, Wrong From the Start?  North Carolinaís ìPredatory Lendingî 
Law and the Practice vs. Product Debate, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 135, 148 (2004). 
 14 Halbrook, supra note 5, at 32. 
 15 Lampe, supra note 13, at 142. 
 16 Id. at 143. 
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policy makers and advocates on both sides of the consumer law 
policy debates.î17 
5. What Areas Of Commerce Involving Consumers Should 
Receive Their Own Sets of Special Rules? 
An issue addressed by two of the symposium authors is 
whether any areas of commerce should be governed by their own 
sets of special rules.  Halbrook argues that trade in firearms 
should be exempt from some forms of litigation, such as suits for 
public nuisance, negligence, ìnegligent design and marketing . . . 
, strict liability for defective . . . products, and ultra-hazardous 
activity.î18  Halbrook argues that the provisions of the Second 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as similar 
provisions in various state constitutions, should foreclose such 
private litigation. 
By comparison, Rustad argues that the unique 
characteristics of Internet commerce require special protections 
for consumers, since few consumers have the technical 
sophistication ìto determine who is tracking their click-streams, 
unleashing viruses, or sending fraudulent offers.î19  Many 
website providers and other Internet businesses have no assets 
or physical, as opposed to virtual, presence in the United 
States.20  Even tortfeasors inside the United States may be 
difficult to locate, as they can falsify the return addresses on 
their emails and so post defamatory or deceptive messages 
anonymously.21  Rustad argues that these aspects of Internet 
commerce render ordinary damages an insufficient deterrent for 
wrongdoing.22 
6. Does Consumer Protection Necessarily or Unduly Limit 
Consumersí Autonomy? 
Professor Harrell sees an immutable, inevitable trade-off 
between the autonomy of consumers and their protection, 
concluding that the two alternatives are (a) party autonomy 
protected and achieved by the consumersí ability to freely to 
enter into contracts and (b) restricted autonomy, caused by 
regulations that limit the products or services or the terms of 
consumer transactions.23  However, I have argued elsewhere that 
 
 17 Harrell, supra note 3, at 122. 
 18 Halbrook, supra note 5, at 11. 
 19 Rustad, supra note 4, at 69. 
 20 Id. at 69-70. 
 21 Id. at 64. 
 22 Id. at 93. 
 23 Harrell, supra note 3, at 132. 
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mere freedom of choice and lack of regulation does not 
necessarily maximize the autonomy of consumers.24  A consumer 
unrestricted by consumer protection law may end up with less 
autonomy if he enters into transactions under the influence of a 
high-pressure sales agent and without the information or time he 
needs to decide what he really wants.25  Worse yet, if unprotected 
by predatory lending regulation, a homeowner who loses her 
house because of a high cost loan could lose the critical personal 
autonomy that being a homeowner provides.26  Paradoxically, 
specific limitations of autonomy, such as absolute freedom to 
contract, may result in the overall maximization of a consumerís 
autonomy.27 
One specific limitation on consumersí freedom to contract is 
caused by merchantsí use of form contracts of adhesion which 
consumers have no means of revising or renegotiating.  Rustad 
notes that such contracts dominate Internet commerce, 
appearing not only as ìshrink-wrapî contracts that a buyer 
purportedly agrees to by opening a product purchased over the 
Internet, but also as ìweb-wrapî contracts that spring into effect 
when one uses a web page.28  Rustad argues that these form 
agreements force consumers, often unwittingly, not only to waive 
their rights to punitive damages and other tort remedies, but 
also to agree to choice of law and choice of forum terms that may 
severely limit their ability to sue.29 
Harrell, on the other hand, asserts that form contracts of 
adhesion do not significantly limit consumer autonomy.  Instead, 
consumers are not prevented from negotiating the significant 
terms of their transactions, such as price.30  Furthermore, 
Harrell argues that at least in consumer credit transactions, 
consumer form contract terms are mandated by law or by the 
secondary market, and these standards are designed not only to 
be consistent but also fair.31 
7. What Forms of Consumer Protections Should Be Used? 
Informational remedies, including the requirement that 
merchants disclose some information regarding their products, 
are perhaps the easiest form of consumer protection to defend.  
 
 24 Kurt Eggert, Lashed To The Mast And Crying For Help: How Self-Limitation Of 
Autonomy Can Protect Elders From Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693 (2002). 
 25 Id. at 732. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 736. 
 28 Rustad, supra note 4, at 88. 
 29 Id. at 87-90. 
 30 Harrell, supra note 3, at 111. 
 31 Id. at 127. 
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Even Greve, who refers to consumer law ìin its modern, 
disembodied stateî as a ìbastard regime,î32 agrees that 
mandatory disclosure requirements can be ìefficient in some 
settings.î33 Narveson frames the question not so much as 
whether the merchant should be required to divulge information, 
but rather how much information is required, how precise that 
information must be, and how high a level of risk must be before 
that risk must be disclosed.34  What punishment should the 
business face if it provides inaccurate information, intentionally 
or otherwise?  The goal, to Narveson, is to ensure that the seller 
does not significantly increase the amount of risk that a 
consumer faces involuntarily.35 
Restrictions on types or terms of agreements and banning 
certain abusive practices are less universally popular.  Greve 
argues that merchants, when faced with limitations on some 
termsósuch as the interest rate they can chargeówill instead 
compete ìon some other, less transparent margin.î36  Lampe 
criticizes the effort to restrict particular loan terms and products 
such as high cost loans, rather than merely attacking abusive 
sales practices and tightening the requirements to be a mortgage 
broker.37 
Consumer protection can be provided not only by giving 
consumers causes of action not recognized by the common law, 
but also by increasing the penalties that consumers can seek, 
including punitive damages for bad behavior by businesses, or by 
providing remedies, such as disgorgement of profits in addition to 
or instead of traditional damages.38  While Greve asserts that 
corporations universally oppose punitive damages,39 Rustad 
notes that in Internet litigation, punitive damages are a sword 
typically wielded by large corporations against individuals, such 
as cybersquatters, spammers, and critics.40  Also, Rustad argues 
that enhanced remedies such as punitive damages are necessary 
to encourage individual litigants to act as private attorneys 
general and so protect other consumers.41 
Greve criticizes other tools of consumer protection, such as 
class actions and laws lessening the common lawís standing 
 
 32 Greve, supra note 2, at 178. 
 33 Id. at 156. 
 34 Narveson, supra note 1, at 194-95. 
 35 Id. at 199. 
 36 Greve, supra note 2, at 161. 
 37 See generally Lampe, supra note 13. 
 38 Greve, supra note 2, at 160. 
 39 Id. at 177. 
 40 Rustad, supra note 4, at 57-58. 
 41 Id. at 100. 
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requirements.  Greve asserts that the procedural protections and 
due process safeguards of class actions ìare deadweight at best 
and an invitation to opportunism at worstî42 and he raises the 
ìspecter that corporate defendants will cut themselves cheap, 
collusive settlements with a plaintiffsí lawyer of their choice.î43  
Unfair competition law that does not involve a certified class 
suffers, Greve argues, from the lack of preclusive effect, thus 
leaving defendants who win, lose, or settle still subject to suit on 
the same or similar claims.44 
Lampe, by comparison, criticizes consumer protection 
regulations that remove the intent requirement and impose strict 
liability, for example on loans that trip certain triggers imposing 
additional regulation on high cost loans.45  Such strict liability is 
even more dangerous, Lampe asserts, when it is framed in 
ìambiguous, non-standard definitionsî and the lender is given 
only a limited opportunity to cure any mistakes or missteps.46 
Both Lampe and Harrell are troubled by laws seeking to 
protect consumers by forcing third parties, such as the assignees 
of loans, to be liable for the bad actions of the original seller or 
lender who dealt with the consumer.  Lampe views such laws as 
a ìmarket disruptiveî47 approach not to mention ìesoteric and 
legally complicated.î48  Harrell is especially wary of class action 
attorneys seeking assignee liability in order to find a deep pocket 
or a windfall and warns that the resulting litigation costs as well 
as liability risks to assignees can harm consumers by driving up 
the cost of doing business.49  I have argued, on the other hand, 
that assignee liability is a crucial weapon in the battle against 
predatory lending, as it forces secondary markets to police 
mortgage brokers.50  By protecting borrowers from abusive loan 
practices, assignee liability should lower, rather than increase, 
the cost of credit. 
Conclusion 
Consumer protection law is a complex, vibrant body of 
doctrine and can be examined from many different viewpoints.  
Chapmanís symposium shows the importance of the questions 
 
 42 Greve, supra note 2, at 166. 
 43 Id. at 167-68. 
 44 Id. at 168. 
 45 Lampe, supra note 13, at 143. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 149. 
 48 Id. at 151. 
 49 Harrell, supra note 3, at 130. 
 50 Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the 
Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503 (2002). 
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that arise from this area of law, as well as how the individual 
authors have chosen to answer them.  From the differing and 
conflicting views that follow should come a richer understanding 
of the balance that must be struck between  protection and 
paternalism in the design and implementation of consumer 
protection laws. 
 
